Return, to what? Syrian returnees in the post-Assad era

After 13 years of conflict, it took only 12 days for the Assad regime in Syria to fall.

From the small region that remained under opposition groups in the northwest (10% of the country’s land), the Turkish-backed armed opposition launched a military operation under the leadership of the former Jihadist organisation Hayat Tahere Alsham (HTS), and with support from two other opposition-affiliated armed groups the capital, Damascus, fell: the US-backed Syrian Free Army and the Southern Operations Room.

By 8 December, the brutal Assad dynasty, which had been in place for over 50 years had collapsed and departed for Russia. Millions of Syrians in the country and around the world celebrated the end of an era.

While much remains unknown about what exactly happened during these extremely unexpected 12 days, and about the conditions that made it possible, preliminary analyses note the catalytic effects of regional conflicts, including the Israel-Gaza war, the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Assad’s patron Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. Great uncertainty also pertains to the geopolitical, economic, humanitarian and development consequences in the region. Yet, it is safe to say they will be enormous and resound for many years to come.

The end of protracted displacement?

One critical outfall that already can be observed is the start of an exodus of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Syrians, from key places of refuge.

The uprising in 2011 and following civil war caused an estimated seven million Syrians to be internally displaced within the country, many of whom found cramped refuge in rebel strongholds. A further 6.3 million had been exiled abroad. In 2023, at least 3.7 million were receiving temporary protection in Türkiye, with a further million estimated to be in Lebanon, and another three quarters of a million in Jordan. Germany offered refuge to a million Syrians since 2015, while the UK offered 50,000 Syrians protection.

Exile in the Levant has allowed people to stay free of the murderous clutches of the regime. In Türkiye and Lebanon, the majority of Syrians moved into urban settings, as they enjoyed a level of freedom of movement and enterprise, to slowly transform towns and cities. Yet, initial warm welcomes extended to them wore out over the years.

For many, exile meant exposure to ragged exploitation in – chiefly – informal labour markets; ever-deepening extreme impoverishment; indecent housing including in abandoned buildings, shacks and sheds; haphazard and inadequate access to humanitarian support; harsh and incomprehensible public policies, and limited legal protection from harms. Especially in the last few years, as regional economies tanked and high levels of inflation took hold, Syrians ended up being convenient political scapegoats, deeply resented and hated by struggling local populations. Protracted displacement has typically been a very bitter experience.

Many, hence, could not wait to return to their places of origin. Already on 9 December, tens of thousands of internally displaced people from the northwest were on the move to Damascus. Turkey has, for the first time in a decade, opened its Yayladagi border, with daily passages estimated at 15 to 20 thousand Syrian returnees. Many Syrians in Lebanon too have already crossed the border. Excitement and hopes are however tempered by knowledge of the material conditions of their property that awaits them upon return.

Returning, to what?

A key element of the Assad regime’s vengeance on dissenters and refugees has been the systematic destruction and dispossession of properties, in violation of their rights. A recent study of seven neighbourhoods in Damascus and elsewhere shows how the urban built environment does not just carry the scars of war.

Areas where rebels had been dislodged have been subject to the regime’s ta’afish, an institutionalised practice of looting. This involved the extraordinary and systematic stripping of residential areas and houses of all valuable materials, first of furniture and everyday consumer items, then the extraction of every sellable part of buildings, including electric wiring, metal pipeworks, roofs, and steel girders and reinforcements. Therefore, many will return to their homes, to literally find empty walls, if anything at all is left of their houses.

Consequently, a huge task lies ahead in restoring and rebuilding the ruined settlements and homes on the land of returning families. Whereas protractedly displaced Syrians have transformed neighbourhoods, towns and cities wherever they found refuge, now they will direct their energies towards rebuilding their lives in Syria. These efforts can be expected to drive the widespread regeneration of informal settlements, where public provisioning of essential water, sanitation, electricity, waste collection and other urban services will be limited for the foreseeable future.

In a way, this is not a great historical departure; even before the civil war started, the Syrian state had a patchy spatial planning record, with large numbers of urban residents living in under-serviced settlements and informal housing. Nevertheless, the capacities of a corrupt and decrepit Syrian state riddled with phantom jobs to manage the urbanisation of return will be severely tested.

Substantial uncertainty also exists about the inclinations and abilities of the HTS leadership to use spatial planning tools and existing law to impose order onto these urbanisation processes. HTS has its roots in an affiliation with al-Qaeda, and has been proscribed by Western powers such as the USA and the UK. Worries persist over the political orientation of HTS and the fate of religious minorities under its rule.

Nevertheless, HTS has since 2016 distanced itself from al-Qaeda. Over the last fortnight, HTS has made efforts to appear as a mature, disciplined and relatively moderate actor, while leading the rebellion and currently, as their affiliate technocrats are taking over the civil service.

Our own recent research also provides some reason for cautious optimism about the nature of Syria’s emerging governance. Supported by the UK Council for At Risk Academics (CARA) Syria Programme, and led by exiled scholars, we investigated the handling of land registries during the civil war. These administrative instruments are critical for facilitating legal economic exchange and for protecting displaced and other people’s land, housing and property rights.

One of our three city case studies was Idlib, Northwest Syria, where HTS cut its administrative teeth and established the Syrian Salvation Government in 2017, to rule with a strong grip. We found Idlib, unlike al-Raqqa and Duma that were controlled by other factions, to be the most stable case. Here, the land registry was managed with professionalism, as former directorate employees were appointed to take charge, ensuring continuity of practice. Moreover, we witnessed a solemn adherence to Syrian property law. This bodes well for the future, and suggests that HTS held territories will find it easier to be incorporated into one common Syrian state.

This blog was originally published on the Institute of Development Studies website, which you can see here.